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INTRODUCTION
Dr. Raphael Bostic argues that a phenomenon called the “social
order dynamic” explains the negative effects on families of various
past and current housing and land use policies.1 Dr. Bostic defines
social order dynamic in the following way: sometimes policymakers
adopt policies to maintain the urban economic order, but “because
domains rarely operate in isolation, efforts to maintain order along
one dimension can exacerbate conditions and increase disorder in
others.”2 “Families, particularly those with low incomes, often live at
the intersection of these conflicting forces,”3 and suffer negative
effects because of such policies. Dr. Bostic’s article (“the Article”)

*

Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. Thanks to the
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL’s editors.
1. See generally Raphael W. Bostic, Urban Policy and Families: How Concerns
About Order Contribute to Familial Disorder, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969 (2016).
2. See id. at 969.
3. See id.
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identifies examples of the social order dynamic, and then offers some
suggestions for avoiding this dynamic or mitigating its effects, while
still serving the original policy goal of maintaining the urban
economic order.
This response to the Article consists of four parts followed by a
brief conclusion. First, I clarify the Article’s thesis and operationalize
the social order dynamic by clarifying its elements. Second, I
compare the Article’s examples of the social order dynamic with the
refined definition of the social order dynamic. Third, I explore the
meaning of social order in the Article and its inextricable relationship
to social welfare. Fourth, in light of these discussions, I consider the
Article’s proposed solutions to the problem and offer an alternative.
I. CLARIFYING THE THESIS AND OPERATIONALIZING THE “SOCIAL
ORDER DYNAMIC”
The Article aims to identify the social order dynamic as a distinct
policymaking or governance problem: a situation in which
policymakers adopt a particular policy to bring social order into one
particular dimension of urban life (i.e., the economic one).4 This
policy, however, has the unintended effect of causing disorder in the
“family” dimension of social life through some kind of spillover
effect.5 In other words, it is a problem of externalities6 applied to
policymaking. Because the Article invents a new phrase to name the
problem it examines, I assume the problem is not just a standard
application of the economic concept of externalities, nor is it just the
traditional argument that every policy has unintended consequences.
To follow and analyze the argument, it is necessary to flesh out the
social order dynamic phenomenon—to make it operational and,
therefore, testable.
The Article views cities in economic terms as “the spatial
realization of firms and households responding to” economic
incentives to invest or to spend.7 “[T]he focus of order in this context
is the preservation of conditions that permit for an efficient

4. See id. at 970.
5. See id. at 970-71.
6. In traditional economic theory, “[e]xternalities occur when producing or
consuming a good causes an impact on third parties not directly related to the
transaction.” Tejvan Pettinger, Externalities–Definition, ECON. HELP (Nov. 28,
2012), http://www.economicshelp.org/blog/glossary/externalities/ [https://perma.cc/
VCE6-X2UF].
7. Bostic, supra note 1, at 972. “[U]rban places are primarily a locus of
commerce.” Id.
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functioning of urban markets, such that resources are primarily
devoted to commerce and production.”8 This focus entails two goals:
(1) limiting impediments to “establishing and operating businesses
and buying and selling finished goods,”9 and (2) permitting “a
maximal amount of private investment, so as to maximize the
productive capacity of the regional economy.”10 In other words, the
Article appears to embrace the standard economic view that
governments create and maintain the conditions for well-functioning
economic markets to maximize social welfare. It explains that certain
“urban disamenities” (e.g., crime) create disorder, that this disorder
leads to both private and public outlays to address it, and that these
expenditures are inefficient because they represent money that could
have been used for more productive purposes.11
At some point, these forms of disorder and the inefficient
expenditures they elicit present “the risk that the costs of urbanizing
exceed the benefits of urbanizing”12 (i.e. threaten the urban economic
order). For this reason, policymakers may seek to avoid or mitigate
“private activities that increase social costs”13 and that interfere with
the desired social order. The focus of the Article is that these efforts
by policymakers to maintain the desired social order (i.e., protect
economic market functioning in urban areas) by reducing or
eliminating externalities may themselves, unintentionally, impose
negative effects on families.14 A further claim is that the negative
impacts on families have a feedback loop that “can cause its own
disorder and undermine the original intent” of the initial policy to
maintain urban economic order.15
The Article identifies three characteristics that define the social
order dynamic as:
[F]irst, one must be able to document that policymakers are focused
on a single problem, and that the problem threatens social order in a
fashion described above. Second, and importantly, the policymaker
must either not be aware of the potential that the policy solution will
adversely affect families or are not (or less) concerned about those

8. See id. at 973-74.
9. Id. at 974.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 972-73.
12. Id. at 973.
13. See id. at 972.
14. The Article distinguishes policies that seek to protect market functioning
(economic social order maintenance) from policies aimed at redistribution or equity.
See id. at 971-75.
15. See id. at 975.
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adverse effects. Finally, the policy choices made to maintain social
order . . . must impose observable negative costs for families.16

Using the Article’s analysis, I think it is more analytically accurate
and useful to parse the characteristics into four as follows: first,
policymakers were only interested in addressing a single problem
(e.g., crime). Second, their concern about that problem is that it
threatens the urban economic order; and the sole or primary objective
of the policy is to maintain the urban economic order by means of
addressing the problem that threatens it. Third, policymakers were
either unaware of the policy’s possible negative impact on families, or
not concerned or less concerned about those possible effects than
about their goal of maintaining the urban economic order. Fourth,
these policies that are intended to promote social order in the
intended single dimension of the urban economic order cause
observable negative effects on families by spilling over into, and
causing disorder in, what might be called the “family dimension.”17
My parsing of the necessary characteristics divides the Article’s
first characteristic into two. The rationale behind this division is that
claiming a policy has a single focal point as the target of its action is
quite distinct from articulating that the concern behind the policy is
that the problem threatens a desired social order.
II. TESTING THE ARTICLE’S EXAMPLES AGAINST THE “SOCIAL
ORDER DYNAMIC” PARADIGM
The social order dynamic is a complex hypothesis because it has
four required characteristics.
Further, it makes important
assumptions about social life. The Article offers numerous examples
of the social order dynamic at work. This Part argues that considering
the information given in the Article, none of the proffered examples
actually meet all of the criteria.
The Article acknowledges that its thesis depends upon one being
“able to document” that the challenged act of governance meets the
characteristics of the social order dynamic.18 For this reason, it seems
fair to test the relationship between the characteristics of the social
order dynamic and the examples offered in the Article.
16. Id. at 974-75.
17. As discussed more thoroughly in Part III, the Article assumes that there are
several distinct dimensions or domains that collectively comprise human experience.
Id. The Article appears to use the terms “dimensions” and “domains” as synonyms.
See, e.g., id. at 970. The Article appears to consider the economic order as distinct
from a dimension in which families live.
18. Id. at 974.
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Upon a close analysis, none of the examples fit all of the criteria
completely, or at least it is impossible to confirm that any examples
completely fit the social order dynamic paradigm because the Article
does not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that all of the
criteria are met. And, in some cases, the information the Article
provides or is otherwise available to this author conflicts with one or
more of the criteria. While each of the policies the Article discusses
contains one or a few characteristics of the social order dynamic,
there is a mismatch between the social order dynamic and the policy
examples discussed in the Article. The only characteristic that every
example meets is the fourth one—that the policy caused negative
impacts on families.
The Article offers three historical examples from federal housing
policy and three contemporary housing policy examples. This
response considers how well each of them meet the four
characteristics defined above.
The Article describes the establishment of the Federal Home Loan
Bank system, the Home Owners Loan Corporation, and the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) as focused on “stabilizing the
banking industry, mortgages, and the housing market” and serving to
“reduce social disorder”19 in response to the Great Depression.
While this example arguably meets the last two characteristics (i.e.,
the policies “were of limited use for renters and lower-income
families”),20 it fails on the first two. Certainly these institutions were
created to reduce social disorder and to support an economic order,
but the social order in view was not a single problem but rather a
massive multifaceted complex of problems from unemployment to
foreclosure. Additionally, the economic order in view was not
specifically or exclusively the urban economy (which is the Article’s
focus) but the national economy.
The Article asserts that “the early-years policies of the [Federal
Housing Administration] represent a classic example of the social
order dynamic.”21 It describes the FHA’s infamous redlining policies
that “only extend[ed] loans to minority families in specific
neighborhoods, mainly those with already large minority
populations.”22 The Article suggests redlining was adopted “[i]n the
name of preserving social order—blacks were thought to adversely

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 977.
Id. at 977-98.
Id. at 978.
Id.
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impact property values.”23 This example conflates the first two
characteristics. The “single problem” being addressed, namely,
blacks living in the same neighborhoods as whites, turns out to be the
same as the overall primary goal of maintaining economic order due
to the belief that “blacks were thought to adversely impact property
values.”24 This merging of the problem—that under the Article’s
thesis is a phenomenon separate from the economic order—and the
economic order itself being fostered renders this example opaque;
redlining was itself an economic policy. On the third characteristic,
this seems a clear case of policymakers being less concerned about the
adverse effects on black families. It clearly meets the fourth
characteristic as the historical record is clear that the policy
“significantly hindered the ability of minority families to access
neighborhoods with strong amenities, thereby limiting their ability to
increase affluence and improve their quality of life.”25
The Article offers the National Housing Act of 1949 as an
additional historical example of the social order dynamic.26 The
Article argues that “urban renewal efforts clearly fit the
framework,”27 specifying the slum removal provision of Title I of the
National Housing Act of 1949 itself. This proposed example elides
the first and second characteristics of the social order dynamic
because the specific policy that purports to be focused on solving a
single problem (namely, the slum removal provision) is part of a
larger statute with many purposes, including economic ones. While
the degree to which the policymakers considered the negative effects
on minority families can be argued, the disproportionate negative
effects on these families referenced in the Article are indisputable.28
The first contemporary example of the social order dynamic is the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD)
policy that “if a member of a family receiving rental assistance is
arrested and convicted of a drug-related or other crime, the entire
family loses its assistance under most circumstances.”29 While this
example meets the first characteristic, because the policy was clearly
enacted to address the problem of crime, it fails the second

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 978-79.
27. Id. at 980.
28. Id. at 978-81.
29. Id. at 981 (citing HUD Denial of Admission and Termination of Assistance
for Criminals and Alcohol Abusers, 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a) (2010)).
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characteristic because, on the Article’s own account, this policy’s
primary goal was to protect the health and safety of public housing
residents.30 While the Article briefly implies that concerns about
economic order must have been “a major driver” of this policy
because the public housing program involves billions of dollars,31 the
Article does not offer any evidence for this assertion. If the
maintenance of urban economic order is the primary motive and goal
of the policy, as the social order dynamic contends, one would expect
that this goal would be evident in the policy’s express justifications.
This example, as with all of the policies offered as examples, does
meet the fourth characteristic because the Article provides solid
evidence that the policy imposed disproportionate negative impacts
on minority families, especially black families.32
As its second contemporary example, the Article offers “the
interaction of two policies . . . housing assistance and school
assignment.”33 While the Article convincingly demonstrates that the
consequences of these policies negatively affect lower-income
families,34 this example is a particularly stark mismatch with the social
order dynamic hypothesis precisely because this example considers
the interaction between two policies, one federal and one local, and
not a policy with a single goal that is enacted primarily to maintain
order in the urban economy.
The final example offered is the common local land use policy of
limiting a parcel in a “single family zone” to a single residential unit
which has the effect of excluding accessory units (also known as
secondary units, in-law units, or granny flats).35 Again, the Article
itself demonstrates that this example does not fit the first
characteristic of the social order dynamic by explaining that this
policy is not aimed at a single problem but several, namely to
“prevent the development of informal residences that could
transform the neighborhood into a shanty town,” to prevent “crime
and other illegal activities,” and “limiting the total population in a

30. Id. at 985 (citing HUD Denial of Admission and Termination of Assistance
for Criminals and Alcohol Abusers, 24 C.F.R. § 982.553(a) (2010)) (explaining “the
intent of these provisions” as “so that residents in their communities can also live in
peace.”).
31. Id. at 986.
32. See id. at 979.
33. Id. at 988.
34. Id. at 991-92.
35. Id. at 993-94.
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neighborhood” to prevent overwhelming demands on existing
infrastructure.36
This example also fails the second characteristic. While the Article
cites some evidence for the view that single family zoning was
intended to serve urban economic order,37 Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty38 and Palo Alto Tenants’ Union v. Morgan39—two
cases cited by the Article—articulated a wide range of public
purposes underlying the creation of single family zoning, including
the general welfare of the community and the “integrity of traditional
families.”40
Moreover, the plaintiffs in Euclid claimed that
comprehensive zoning, including the single family element,
undermined the regional economy by inappropriately interfering with
natural economic development.41 As with all of the Article’s
examples, the negative effects of the policy on some families are well
documented.
Many, if not most, policies enacted by legislatures attempt to
promote several goals, not just one. To show that the policies the
Article offers as examples were only focused on one goal would
require references to both the legislative findings and policies sections
of statutes themselves articulating a single goal as well as to legislative
history to confirm the single-minded intent of the policymakers. But,
the Article does not provide such evidence. Rather it offers plausible
policy reasons for each policy without giving a complete account.
Frequently, policies claim to improve “general welfare” which cannot
be equated to “urban economic order,” even if a thriving urban
economy is likely to be part of general welfare. At most there is some
evidence of economic motivation in all of the examples, but on the
information provided, this economic interest is not necessarily
directed toward promoting the efficient functioning of an urban
economy, much less directed toward the economic details that the
Article identifies (e.g., promoting investment).42

36. Id. at 993.
37. Id.
38. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding comprehensive zoning did not violate the federal
Constitution).
39. 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973) (upholding the constitutionality of single-family
zoning ordinances).
40. Bostic, supra note 1, at 996.
41. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 385 (alleging that the ordinance “has the effect of
diverting the normal industrial, commercial and residential development [of the
region].”).
42. Bostic supra note 1, at 974.
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And some policies do not appear to be aimed at maintaining the
urban economic order. For example, the Article characterizes local
housing codes regulating the quality of housing conditions as “clearly
motivated by a desire to maintain order,”43 but then the Article itself
identifies the concerns behind those policies as “public health
implications of the slums and the moral character of their
residents.”44 In the next Part, I discuss how this policy and several
others described in the Article seek not to maintain a social order,
much less to help maintain the then existing urban economic order,
but to change the existing social order to serve certain social and
moral goals.
While the social order dynamic may explain the negative effects of
some policies in some contexts, I am not persuaded that the examples
offered in the Article fit this paradigm. Clearly, all of the policies had
negative effects on at least some families, but the Article does not
offer persuasive evidence or argument that the social order dynamic
is the best explanation for how and why these policies had such
negative effects. Because all of the policies had negative effects on
families, the examples may fit the more traditional critiques of
policy—that all policies have unintended consequences or
externalities—rather than the social order dynamic as a particular,
newly-identified phenomenon that is the focus of the Article. In the
next Part, I discuss how the policies consistently serve certain
families’ interests but not those of other families. This suggests that
these examples are more consistent with critiques of urban policy as
racist and classist.
III. PROBING “SOCIAL ORDER” AND ITS INEXTRICABLE
RELATIONSHIP TO “SOCIAL WELFARE”
Obviously, social order is a critical concept at the heart of the
Article.45 Given that, it would be helpful to spell out more of what is
being referenced and to make some distinctions. This Part argues
that the Article’s conception of social order is incomplete or
confused, at least in part, because it fails to acknowledge that any
conception of social order is intertwined with a notion of social
welfare. The Article’s reliance on an economic social order carries
that model’s assumptions with it, but the author’s concerns seem to

43. Id. at 976-77.
44. Id. at 976.
45. “The overarching thesis of this analysis is that many urban policies primarily
focus on maintaining social order . . . .” Id. at 970.
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place him in an odd relationship to the traditional economic model,
including by postulating the existence of a distinct “family order” and
by his attention to equity issues. Finally, given the diversity of
families and their distinct economic and social baselines, this Part
questions the Article’s implicit assumption that a policy can serve the
apparently monolithic “family order.”
As the prior Part demonstrated, it is not clear that most of these
policies are aimed at any identifiable single “domain.” Nor is it
obvious that “families” are a cognizably different “sphere” or domain
from urban economics. To support the Article’s thesis persuasively, it
needs a general social theory to underpin this analysis that would
explain the relationship between the economy and other dimensions,
such as a family dimension, as the Article envisions.46
More fundamentally, what is social order? Of course, like any
other concept there can be many understandings. In this author’s
view, in a world of people with diverse views of the good life and
distinct interests, there is no possible social order that is value-free or
value-neutral. Social order only makes sense in a more concrete
application: social order for whom? Social order always serves a
more or less clear concept of social welfare.
The Article
acknowledges that an efficient market economy as a social order
seeks to “maximize income and wealth in the economy” but “do[es]
not ensure that [wealth and income] are distributed such that
everyone receives enough to achieve a minimum quality of life.”47 I
would go further and argue that every actual social order favors the
values and interests of some groups and disfavors others. Even a thin
concept of social order as merely “maintaining stability” favors the
interests of whoever benefits from the status quo.
All policies are intended in some measure to promote some
conception of social welfare. And any conception of social welfare
relies, at least implicitly, on some conception of social order necessary
or sufficient to enable it. The two concepts are interdependent. The
critical issue is what conception of social welfare are the policies
promoting? And what view of social order do they think is needed
(or best) to get there?
The Article contends that the policies are geared to promoting an
urban economic order. Unfortunately, beyond a general articulation
of promoting investment and reducing costs in urban markets, the

46. My understanding of the dominant school of contemporary economics (the
neoclassical or Chicago School Economics) would not provide such a theory.
47. Bostic, supra note 1, at 971-72.
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Article omits a more complete description of the content of the social
order being promoted by the policies it examines. The traditional
economic theory upon which the Article relies includes both a version
of a preferred social order (i.e., efficient markets) and a version of
social welfare (i.e., the individualistic consumption of resources to
fulfill preferences) that such order serves. The Article’s reliance on
this theory is curious because traditional economic theory is typically
uninterested in distributional consequences or “equity,”48 yet all of
the negative consequences on families that the Article identifies are
distributional in nature.
Upon careful consideration of the examples that the Article offers,
a clear pattern emerges of what conception of social welfare is behind
the social order being promoted. Generally, none of the policies were
“anti-family” per se in that they harmed all families. Nor were they
arbitrary policies that were blind to their effects on families. Rather,
each of the policies were directly aimed at promoting a classist and/or
racist conception of social order that served the interests of some
families at the cost of the interests of other families. Specifically, they
served middle and upper class white families while harming lowerincome families and families of color.
It appears undisputed that the FHA’s intentionally discriminatory
redlining policies served the interests of white families but not
families of color.49 Urban renewal and slum removal provisions
predictably served white and middle class families over those of lowincome families and families of color. The limitation on formerly
incarcerated people living in public housing mostly negatively affects
African American families and communities.50 And, a great deal of
literature has argued that single family zoning districts had a clear
socio-economic social order in mind.51 This should not be a surprising

48. See Dr. Bostic’s distinction between efficiency and equity, noting “[t]he
redistribution need arises because competitive markets maximize income and wealth
in the economy but do not ensure that they are distributed such that everyone
receives enough to achieve a minimum quality of life. Thus, those concerned with
equity might find that the distribution of resources across families is suboptimal and
look to policy to improve the situation.” Id.
49. Id. at 978 (“In the name of preserving social order-blacks were thought to
adversely impact property values-the FHA instituted a policy whereby it would only
extend loans to minority families in specific neighborhoods, mainly those with
already large minority populations.”) (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 988 (commenting that because a large percentage of African Americans
are incarcerated, “[t]his suggests that the individual impacts discussed above are
being felt at a large scale”).
51. See, e.g., Martha A. Lees, Preserving Property Values? Preserving Proper
Homes? Preserving Privilege?: The Pre-Euclid Debate Over Zoning for Exclusively
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finding. Urban land use and housing policy has often been criticized
as being deployed to create or maintain a classist and racist social
order.52
The Article’s examples amount to a critique of housing and other
urban policy as consistently biased to serve the interests of white and
middle- or upper-income families, despite the Article’s qualification
that “very few policymakers have goals that are actively pernicious to
families, particularly lower-income families.”53
The Article implicitly raises the fundamental question: is it possible
to have a single coherent, consistent family-friendly policy in
housing? As the Article notes, there are different kinds of families:
low- and moderate-income, minority and white, homeowners and
renters, nuclear families and intergenerational families, traditional
families and non-traditional families.54 In fact, “family” itself can be
defined differently, and it appears that families in the United States
are getting more diverse. Each of these families has different,
sometimes conflicting, interests regarding housing and other goods.
In other words, families’ interests in housing are generally not
monolithic. Therefore, an analysis should not essentialize families:
different families have different interests and they conflict, so some
policies serve “families” but not all families. Perhaps no policy can
serve all types of families. Perhaps the Article’s implicit assumption
that policies aimed at maintaining urban economic order could be
expected to serve all families equally is naïve. Probably most policies
will have diverse effects on different kinds of families, both because
of the baseline of their wealth, income, and other measures of wellbeing, based upon prior policies, and because of their current needs
and interests.
Private Residential Areas, 1916-1926, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 375-76 (1994). See
generally INTEGRATING SPACES: PROPERTY LAW AND RACE (Alfred Brophy et al.
eds., 2011). Notably, the judge in the district court opinion in the Euclid case that

was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court found it obvious that comprehensive zoning
was a form of socio-economic engineering. See Amber Realty Co. v. Village of
Euclid, 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
52. See, e.g., Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for
Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 553-65 (2007) (arguing that “housing as
providing social order” is one important frame for understanding housing law and
policy).
53. See Bostic, supra note 1, at 1006.
54. A more complete list of family diversity would include the following:
traditional “nuclear” families versus non-traditional families; intergenerational
families; families of different and mixed “races;” families of different levels of income
and wealth; renters and homeowners; immigrants and current citizens or legalized
residents; families living in urban, suburban and rural areas; families with members in
prison and families without members in prison, etc.
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In conclusion, these policies are better explained by the particular
conception of “social welfare” that the policymakers had in mind
(consciously or unconsciously) than by the social order dynamic.
More information about the origin of these policies—both the stated
justifications and a more complete contextualized historical account—
could reveal hidden or even unconscious reasons why these policies
were enacted.
IV. SOLVING THE GOVERNANCE PROBLEM WITH A “FAMILY
IMPACT STATEMENT” POLICY
The Article purports to identify the social order dynamic as a
particular kind of governance problem.55 This Part first argues that
while the Article does not convincingly identify the social order
dynamic as a novel governance problem, its proposed solutions are
still valuable. Second, the examples discussed in the Article do reveal
a different governance problem—the systematic favoring of middle
class white families’ interests over those of lower-income families of
color in urban and housing policy. And, third, a “family impact
statement” could be a politically practical and effective solution to
that governance problem.
Despite my conclusion that the Article’s examples do not actually
exemplify the social order problem, it appears to me that solutions
that the Article proposes would likely mitigate the social order
dynamic problem to the degree it exists.56 In fact, the proposals—
such as sharing information, incentives for coordination, and avoiding
over-specialization—aimed at promoting better policy making by
avoiding narrow and parochial mindsets are eminently reasonable
and very useful, even if not based on the Article’s problem analysis.
While the Article initially identifies the social order dynamic as the
governance problem, it later nods to certain political realities as the
more fundamental cause of the inequities that are the focus of its
concern. Specifically, it states:
[P]olicy makers prioritize social order over the well-being of lowerincome families, who often are not their main constituents. Their
only attention to such populations is in the context of problems, and
so they are disinclined to give priority until they become such a large
problem that ignoring them becomes impossible . . . . This is
55. Bostic, supra note 1, at 974-75 (describing the social order dynamic as a
problem of policy-making) and at 1002 (offering solutions to this governance
problem).
56. See id. at 999-1004 (discussing the Article’s proposed solutions to the social
order dynamic).
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exacerbated by realities of political campaigns, in which wealthier
interests who typically have the most to gain by preserving and
enforcing social order are the main financiers of elected officials.57

In other words, the reason policymakers address the problems they
do in the way they do is because they view their political interests as
being best served by taking care of relatively wealthy and regularly
involved constituents (read: white and middle class families). In this
sense, the policies the Article discusses and their effects do derive
from a governance problem, but a much more commonly recognized
one: that our elected officials serve the needs and interests of the
people they perceive as their primary constituents, sometimes called
the capture of elected officials by well-organized and funded
interests.58
To the degree that social order dynamic and this governance
problem exist, a “Family Impact Statement” (FIS) modeled on the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)59 may be the best
realistic solution. This type of policy aims to prevent or mitigate the
likely negative effects of policies on a favored domain (e.g., the
environment) by forcing the production of certain information about
the likely negative effects of a proposed policy, requiring public
consideration of these effects before the policy is enacted, and
enabling the revision of a proposed policy to eliminate or reduce the
negative effects through this public examination.60 This type of
regulation is already widely in use in the environmental and health
realms.61 While NEPA imposes a national requirement, many states
have enacted their own equivalent laws.62

57. Id. at 1006.
58. “According to the broad interpretation, regulatory capture is the process
through which special interests affect state intervention in any of its forms.” Ernesto
Dal Bo, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y, 203, 203
(2006).
59. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(f) (2012).
60. Tim Iglesias, Housing Impact Assessments: Opening New Doors for State
Housing Regulation While Localism Persists, 82 OR. L. REV. 433, 435-436 (2003)
(describing how NEPA works).
61. For an analysis of the use of impact statements in the environmental context,
see SERGE TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (Stan. Univ. Press
1984). For a discussion of health impact statements, see CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/healthyplaces/hia.htm
[https://perma.cc/3285-5UYH].
62. For a discussion of NEPA and state equivalents, see Iglesias, supra note 60, at
435-36.
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There are several reasons to believe that an FIS would both be
politically feasible and effective in considering and serving the needs
and interests of diverse families. This kind of policy has a strong
theoretical grounding in the “reflexive law” tradition.63 Such a policy
is consistent with the Article’s argument because it would incorporate
a procedural step in the policymaking process to specifically consider
potential negative effects on families thereby preventing or mitigating
any adverse consequences of the social order dynamic.64 And,
Professor Clare Huntington’s book, Failure to Flourish, which
provides the conceptual backdrop for this Colloquium, points to (but
does not develop) this suggestion.65 Indeed some versions of a family
impact analysis are already being used in some jurisdictions and by
some organizations.66
One reason why this type of regulation may be politically realistic
in the current difficult policy realm is because it does not prescribe a
particular outcome or policy choice. Rather, it only requires the
production, distribution, and consideration of relevant information on
the potential significant impacts of a policy on what the Article calls a
particular domain or dimension. In a democracy rooted in liberal
rationalism, it is hard to oppose a requirement for the provision and
consideration of relevant information.67 The fact recognized by the
63. See id. at 496-501. In that article, I proposed such a solution to housing
affordability and other housing problems. Id. Housing impact statements are now
becoming popular. See generally Brentin Mock, The Growing Trend of Affordable
Housing Impact Statements, CITYLAB (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.citylab.com/housing/
2016/01/the-growing-trend-of-affordable-housing-impact-statements/423333/
[https://perma.cc/Q6V9-UJ2Z].
64. “[C]onsistent creation of policies that do not suffer from the ‘social order
dynamic’, in which policies are pursued to create and maintain social order without
making allowances for collateral impacts, requires attention to the issue and a policymaking infrastructure that creates incentives for decision-makers to do so.” Bostic,
supra note 1, at 1007.
65. See CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 184-85 (2014).
66. See, e.g., MARCIA G. ORY, POLICY AND THE AMERICAN FAMILY: A MANUAL
FOR FAMILY IMPACT ANALYSIS (1978); Marcia G. Ory, Family Impact Analysis:
Concepts and Methodologies, 8 POL’Y STUD. J. 941 (1980); Theodora Ooms, Taking
Families Seriously: Family Impact Analysis as an Essential Policy Tool,
https://www.purdue.edu/hhs/hdfs/fii/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/pf_fis02supp
report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XBM-N5HA]; A Checklist for Assessing the Impact of
Policies on Families, Policy Institute for Family Impact Seminars,
http://aces.nmsu.edu/ces/familyimpactseminar/documents/family-impact-checklist.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5RT4-Z24P]. See generally FAM. IMPACT INST., PURDUE UNIV.,
https://www.purdue.edu/hhs/hdfs/fii/hello-world/ [https://perma.cc/QJ9B-DBHE].
67. Of course, there are debates about the actual relevance of information
produced in environmental impact statements and the relative benefits compared to
the costs.
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Article that revising policies already in place is slow and difficult68 is
further support for family impact statements because, if effective,
they would prevent policies with significant negative effects on
families from being enacted in the first place.
An FIS would also be helpful to respond to the historical problem
of lower-income and minority families suffering negative effects of
urban policies documented by the Article. Given the past policies
and current economic situation of lower-income and minority
families, even explicitly and intentionally “pro-family” urban policies
will have different actual effects on different families. By producing
information about the impact of a proposed policy on the whole range
of families and requiring a public discussion about this information,
the FIS would require the production of information that would not
otherwise have been created or assembled (e.g., about the disparity of
impacts between different kinds of families). The availability and
dissemination of such information could promote a more thoughtful
and careful public debate about the balancing of costs and benefits to
different types of families. Given the enhanced awareness about the
negative effects of past policies (as the Article demonstrates), an FIS
has the potential to avoid a repeat of these awful results.
The diversity of actual families’ needs and interests is both a reason
supporting the need for an FIS and a potential limit to its efficacy. In
addition, the “culture wars context” regarding families would
certainly complicate any actual use of FIS. For example, New
Urbanist policies69 (which are endorsed in Failure to Flourish70) have
been opposed by conservatives as overly intrusive government
intervention in the private lives of families as well as overregulation
of private property rights.71 Because of the varied and conflicting
interests of the wide range of types of families, some skepticism about
whether there can be a single coherent, consistent family-friendly
policy in housing is justified.72
68. Bostic, supra note 1, at 999.
69. “As an alternative to sprawling development, New Urbanism encourages the
development of compact, urban, walkable, diverse, and sustainable communities that
promote a sense of connectedness among residents. New Urbanism preserves the
traditional neighborhood structure, with a large central public space, a range of
homes, shops and businesses within a ten-minute walking distance, and physically
attractive surroundings and architecture intended to create a sense of enjoyment and
belonging for residents.” HUNTINGTON, supra note 65, at 182.
70. Id. at 180-82.
71. See, e.g., Rick Henderson & Adrian T. Moore, Plan Obsolescence, REASON,
June 1998, at 42.
72. One possibility is policies that enable housing stability. The Article does nice
work in gathering several studies about the value of housing stability. Whether
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Of course, much of the efficacy of an FIS would depend upon how
it was designed and implemented.73 Importantly, the traditional
impact statement-type regulation does not require policymakers to
enact a policy that has no harmful effects on the subject population.
Rather, if they decide to enact a policy that will have negative effects,
they are required to draft and adopt a statement explaining why they
are going forward despite the negative impacts.74 In other words,
they could not pass a policy that has negative impacts without at least
an awareness of the negative effects as they might have done in the
past. This means that an FIS would not necessarily improve the
results of urban policies for lower-income and minority families.
However, the explicit recognition by decision-makers of their
knowledge of the tradeoffs that they are making may provide a
certain sense of satisfaction, and possibly even political
accountability.
The other benefit of an FIS requirement to lower-income and
minority families is that it provides a formal, guaranteed opportunity
for them to assert their interests and views about how potential
tradeoffs in a proposed policy will affect them. They will have an
opportunity to oppose or attempt to revise a harmful policy before it
is enacted. This benefit responds to the Article’s acknowledgment
that lower-income and minority families are often not an integral part
of the policymaking process.75 However, the actual value of this
opportunity is integrally dependent upon that community’s capacity
to organize itself to participate effectively in the political process so
that it can take advantage of the opportunity. This capacity is at least
partially dependent upon the economic, social, and political resources
of this community. Therefore, there is something of a catch-22
involved. If these communities are already disempowered in part due
to prior policies that negatively affected them, they are less able to
take advantage of this new opportunity. The Article’s explicit
recognition that wealth has a disproportionate impact in urban

having the opportunity for “housing stability” is a commonly shared interest of all
families is an open question worth investigating.
73. For an analysis of factors that contribute to the efficacy of this kind of
regulation, see Iglesias, supra note 60, at 472-74.
74. See, e.g., Guideline 15093 for the California Environmental Quality Act, 14
Cal. Code Regs. §§ 15080-15097, http://resources.ca.gov/ceqa/guidelines/art7.html
[https://perma.cc/VS3R-R69H] (enabling an agency to adopt a “Statement of
Overriding Consideration” if it elects to approve a project that will have significant
but unmitigated environmental impacts).
75. Bostic, supra note 1, at 1006.
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policymaking highlights this limitation on the actual value of an FIS
requirement.76
So, while an FIS requirement would probably be a good policy that
is consistent with the argument and analysis in Failure to Flourish, it
is important to recognize that it would not be a cure-all.77 It promotes
information-gathering, conversation, and debate—all of which are
appropriate where interests of different families may diverge—but it
does not change the current balance of economic and political power
in a community. It only creates a possibility of better policies through
better information and public debate.
CONCLUSION
I am open to the possibility that the social order dynamic the
Article describes does occur in some contexts and that the suggested
solutions are valuable things to improve our policy-making and
governance. However, I think these points are only loosely related to
the particular housing policies the Article analyzes. Even if the social
order dynamic exists, it is not clear how common or important it is in
explaining how and why so many housing and land use policies
regularly harm some families, especially low-income families and
people of color. To the degree that the social order dynamic or some
variation of it is a problem, the best solution would be a “family
impact statement” policy.
There is some indication in the Article that its focus on the social
order dynamic hopes to avoid hard conversations about equity by
framing the problem as a governance issue based upon the social
order dynamic. I believe we cannot avoid the equity issue by focusing
on the social order dynamic as a governance issue; rather, because
social order and a conception of social welfare are inextricably linked,
we must wrestle with the equity issues directly. An FIS requirement
would create the occasion for such conversations. And this solution
would be more efficacious if participants can learn to “talk purple,”
that is, in ways that transcend current cultural wars, as Professor
Huntington recommends.78

76. Id.
77. This discussion is consistent with the recognition of the “limits of flourishing
family law” in FAILURE TO FLOURISH. HUNTINGTON, supra note 65, at 203-21.
Professor Huntington recognizes three types of limits: political resistance, the limits
of application, and limits of what law can actually do. Id.
78. Id. at 211-14.

